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 THE IMPACT OF GOVERNMENT 
APPELLATE STRATEGIES ON THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF CRIMINAL LAW 
ANDREW HESSICK* 
Appellate courts are a principal source of change in and growth of the 
criminal law.  In the course of resolving disputes, appellate courts announce 
rules that govern future cases.  For the government, seeing that these rules 
develop in a favorable way is often more important than the outcome in the 
case before the appellate court.  The government is charged with protecting 
the public, and developing generally applicable rules of criminal law is often 
more important in obtaining that goal than securing the conviction of one 
individual.  In its efforts to ensure the development of government-friendly 
rules, the government does not depend solely on the merits of its substantive 
arguments; it also uses strategies on appeal, sometimes over the course of 
many appeals, to nudge courts to adopt rules that are favorable to the 
government or to establish obstacles designed to discourage courts from 
adopting unfriendly rules. 
This Article describes some of these strategies and discusses how they 
may affect the development of the law.  It proceeds in three parts.  Part I 
introduces the subject by explaining why the government is in a better 
position than individual criminal defendants to use strategy on appeal to 
influence the law.  Unlike criminal defendants, the government is a party in 
all criminal appeals.  Its repeated appearances allow the government to 
develop and implement a long-term strategy over a series of cases to affect the 
law.  Part II explores the various strategies employed by the government on 
appeal.  As this Part explains, those strategies range from the simple technique 
of refusing to make one argument in a case in an effort to get the court to 
decide the case based on a different argument, to the much more complex 
strategy of bringing a series of cases in a particular order to bring about, 
through incremental changes, a legal doctrine that an appellate court would 
have been inclined to reject had the government sought the legal change in 
one fell swoop.  Part III addresses the normative question of the desirability of 
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the government‘s influence over the law through appellate strategies.  It 
concludes that this influence may be undesirable not only because it imbues 
the Executive with some level of control over the development of the law, but 
also because it gives the government another advantage in a criminal process 
that is already skewed in favor of the government.  Part III further explains, 
however, that courts can reduce the impact of appellate strategies by refusing 
to be swayed by them. 
I.  THE DIFFERING ROLES OF THE CRIMINAL DEFENDANT AND  
OF THE GOVERNMENT 
Criminal appeals have a different purpose for criminal defendants than for 
the government.  The principal goal of the criminal defendant in a criminal 
case, before the court of appeals as before the trial court, is to avoid a 
judgment of guilty and the consequential punishment.  He is usually not 
particularly interested in the reason for his victory.  The criminal defendant 
will generally be happy with any reason for his acquittal, be it that the search 
leading to his arrest was illegal, the conduct for which he was charged is 
constitutionally protected, or the judge improperly instructed the jury.  But 
how a criminal defendant wins his appeal can have immense impact on future 
cases.  The reasoning that underlies an appellate decision establishes legal 
rules for future cases.
1
  With rare exceptions like Griswold v. Connecticut,
2
 
criminal defendants generally have no interest in developing particular legal 
rules.
3
  Criminal defendants are not an organized group seeking to protect the 
interests of other criminal defendants.  Today‘s defendants have no reason to 
seek to establish rules that will protect the next defendant tomorrow.
4
 
 
1. To avoid appearing arbitrary in resolving disputes, courts announce rules providing the basis 
for their decisions.  When an appellate court announces a rule, that rule becomes part of the law, 
binding lower courts within that appellate court‘s purview, and in the federal system, the appellate 
court itself.   
2. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).  
3. Id. at 481 (where appellants ―raise[d] the constitutional rights of the married people with 
whom they had a professional relationship‖). 
4. Consider Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).  There, Ring, who was convicted of murder 
and sentenced to death, argued that the imposition of his death sentence violated the Sixth 
Amendment because it turned on facts that were found by a judge instead of a jury.  Id. at 595.  
Ring‘s argument, which prevailed before the Supreme Court, was that when a factual finding is 
necessary to support a punishment of death, the Sixth Amendment requires that a jury, not a judge, 
make those factual findings.  Id. at 609.  Although Ring won his case, the legal rule the case 
established may disadvantage future defendants, since judges may be less inclined to impose the 
death penalty than jurors, who, not having tried any other cases, are likely to consider any murder to 
be heinous enough to warrant death.  Although there is some evidence to the contrary, see Paul 
Mancino, III, Note, Jury Waiver in Capital Cases: An Assessment of the Voluntary, Knowing, and 
Intelligent Standard, 39 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 605, 613 (1991) (concluding that judges in Florida and 
Alabama impose death more often than juries), those studies focus on states where judges face 
reelection.  
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For the government, things are different.  Like criminal defendants, the 
government is interested in winning each case on appeal; however, the 
government also is interested in developing rules.  The government is charged 
with protecting the public, and it has an interest in fostering a criminal law 
that best achieves that goal.  That interest often trumps the government‘s 
interest in winning a particular case because rules prescribe generally 
applicable codes of conduct for the public while the outcome in a particular 
case is relevant only to the defendant in that case. 
The government may employ strategies to encourage or facilitate the 
creation of government-friendly law on appeal.  The government is able to 
implement these strategies because it is a repeat player before the courts of 
appeals.  Unlike a criminal defendant, who appears only in his own case, the 
government appears in all criminal appeals.  This constant involvement does 
not simply provide the government with numerous opportunities to influence 
the growth of the criminal law; it also allows the government to be flexible in 
how it seeks to influence the law.  Instead of seeking to change the law based 
solely on the strength of its substantive arguments, the government may try to 
control the development of the law through procedural strategies such as 
selecting a specific case to press particular substantive arguments.  Indeed, the 
ability to influence law through these procedural strategies is one reason that 
all decisions whether to appeal cases that the federal government has lost is 
centralized in the Solicitor General.
5
 
Conversely, because they are not repeat players, individual defendants 
generally do not engage in similar strategic behavior.  There are, however, 
pro-defense interest groups such as the American Civil Liberties Union 
(ACLU) that may engage in strategic behavior on appeal in an effort to 
influence the law.  But their strategizing is likely to be less effective.  Unlike 
the government, interest groups usually do not have the resources to 
participate in all criminal cases.  It therefore may be more difficult for these 
groups to influence the law through sustained strategies.  An interest group‘s 
ability to strategize may also be hampered by its ethical obligations to clients.  
As with all defense lawyers, the principal task of an interest group 
representing a defendant is to protect that client‘s interest.  Ensuring that the 
client wins is always more important than developing rules favorable to a 
future defendant.
6
  The government does not face similar ethical constraints 
because the government is its own client.  Similarly, interest groups may face 
 
5. See U.S. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS‘ MANUAL § 9-2.170 (2007); 28 C.F.R. 
§ 0.20(b) (2009).  
6. See Seth P. Waxman, Foreword: Does the Solicitor General Matter?, 53 STAN. L. REV. 
1115, 1117 (2001) (―[N]one other [than the Solicitor General] has the authority to decline to pursue 
cases solely because doing so would not promote the orderly development of the law.‖).  
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constitutional constraints that the government does not.  For example, 
criminal defense lawyers cannot waive their clients‘ constitutional right to the 
assistance of counsel
7
 or the right to plead not guilty,
8
 and unless a client 
waives those rights, they limit the arguments available to the criminal defense 
lawyer.  Government lawyers, by contrast, do not face similar constraints 
because the Constitution does not afford the government similar constitutional 
rights in criminal trials. 
II.  GOVERNMENT APPELLATE STRATEGIES 
On appeal, the government may employ several strategies to influence the 
development of criminal law.  Most fall into two broad categories: argument 
selection and case selection.  The discussion below explores these, and other, 
government strategies on appeal.  In doing so, it focuses on the federal 
government‘s employment of these strategies, not because states do not 
engage in similar strategies, but because information on federal strategies is 
more readily available.  Similarly, this Article often uses U.S. Supreme Court 
cases as examples.  The strategies considered in appealing to the Supreme 
Court also apply in appeals to the circuit courts, because the Supreme Court is 
an appellate court.  However, Supreme Court cases are more likely to be 
familiar to the reader than those from the circuit courts. 
A.  Argument Selection 
Aside from appeals that focus solely on disputes about factual findings by 
the trial court, the primary issue in an appeal is what legal rule should apply to 
the case at hand.  The principal tool in those appeals is reasoned argument.  
The parties argue in support of the legal rule that they think should control the 
case and then demonstrate why they should prevail under that rule. 
In this process, most parties choose the arguments that most likely assure 
them of victory.  The government, however, may deliberately forsake its best 
argument in favor of an argument that is less certain of victory but more 
beneficial to the government‘s long-term policy interests.  An example is 
United States v. Leon.
9
  There, police conducted searches based on a warrant 
for the homes of several people suspected of drug dealing.
10
  Although the 
warrant was facially valid, the district court suppressed the evidence seized 
during the search based on the conclusion that the affidavits supporting the 
warrant did not establish probable cause, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
11
  
 
7. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465 (1938). 
8. Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 7 (1966). 
9. 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 
10. Id. at 902.   
11. Id. at 902–03, 905. 
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Following the Ninth Circuit‘s decision, however, the Supreme Court in 
Illinois v. Gates announced a new standard for probable cause,
12
 under which 
the Leon warrant likely would have been found sufficient.
13
  The federal 
government, however, did not seek a GVR
14
 from the Supreme Court.
15
  
Moreover, its petition for a writ of certiorari expressly declined to challenge 
the lower courts‘ determination that the warrant was unsupported by probable 
cause.
16
  Instead, the government argued only that the exclusionary rule 
should not apply to ―‗evidence seized in reasonable, good-faith reliance on a 
search warrant that is subsequently held to be defective.‘‖17  Courts generally 
seek to avoid deciding cases based on arguments that are not made because 
the courts are left without the benefit of the adversary process.
18
  Thus, the 
government‘s decision not to challenge the finding of probable cause 
encouraged the Court to issue a ruling on the good-faith exception.
19
 
Similarly, the government may refuse to pursue an argument out of fear 
that it will result in bad precedent.  MacDonald v. United States
20
 is an 
example.  MacDonald, a former Army captain, was indicted on three counts 
of murder.
21
  The Fourth Circuit ordered the charges dismissed on the ground 
that MacDonald‘s speedy trial rights had been violated,22 explaining that four-
 
12. 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).  
13. Leon, 468 U.S. at 961 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in 
part) (―It is probable, though admittedly not certain, that the Court of Appeals would now conclude 
that the warrant in Leon satisfied the Fourth Amendment if it were given the opportunity to 
reconsider the issue in the light of Gates.‖). 
14. ―GVR‖ refers to the grant, vacation, and remand of a judgment.  
15. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 905 (majority opinion). 
16. Id. 
17. Id.  
The Government‘s petition for certiorari expressly declined to seek review 
of the lower courts‘ determinations that the search warrant was unsupported by 
probable cause and presented only the question ―[w]hether the Fourth 
Amendment exclusionary rule should be modified so as not to bar the admission 
of evidence seized in reasonable, good-faith reliance on a search warrant that is 
subsequently held to be defective.‖ 
Id. (citation omitted). 
18. Cf. Harmon v. Thornburgh, 878 F.2d 484, 494 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (reluctance to make 
constitutional ruling ―heightened by the absence of any meaningful argument by the parties‖ on the 
issue). 
19. Leon, 468 U.S. at 913.  The government‘s strategy in Leon may also have been informed by 
the fact that the case presented the good-faith issue to the Court in a particularly favorable light: The 
law enforcement officers‘ actions may have seemed all the more reasonable because, after Gates, 
probable cause was arguably present.  For more discussion on this topic, see infra notes 56–71 and 
accompanying text. 
20. 456 U.S. 1 (1982). 
21. Id. at 3, 5. 
22. Id. at 5.   
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and-a-half years earlier the Army had charged, though ultimately not 
prosecuted, MacDonald with the same murders while he was a captain in the 
Army.
23
  It was hardly clear that the Army‘s charges triggered MacDonald‘s 
right to a speedy trial.  But the government chose not to seek review on that 
ground.
24
  Instead, it challenged the dismissal solely on the ground that the 
delay between the original military charges and the subsequent indictment did 
not violate the right to a speedy trial.
25
  It is reasonable to think that the 
decision was motivated in part by a fear that, if the Court were to reject the 
argument that military charges do not start the speedy trial clock, it might do 
so in a way that suggested that military charges triggered the whole panoply 
of Sixth Amendment rights.
26
  Framing the case in terms of the amount of 
delay reduced the chances of such a ruling. 
The government also engages in triage when selecting its arguments in 
situations where the defendant is appealing an adverse ruling.  When the 
government perceives that the Court is inclined to rule in a way that is 
unfavorable to its interests, the government may focus more on reducing the 
impact of the decision than on trying to win the particular case.  Consider 
Miranda v. Arizona.
27
  The issue in that case was whether police had to 
inform suspects in custody of their rights to remain silent and to consult an 
attorney before interrogation.
28
  Two terms earlier, in Escobedo v. Illinois, the 
Court held that the police acted unconstitutionally by interrogating a suspect 
in custody whom they prevented from speaking with his attorney.
29
  In light of 
Escobedo, the federal government, which participated as an amicus in 
Miranda, concluded that it would be fruitless to try to convince the Court to 
allow the confession in Miranda.
30
  So instead of trying to convince the Court 
 
23. Id. at 4–5. 
24. Brief for the United States at 28–29, United States v. MacDonald, 356 U.S. 1 (1982) 
(No. 80-1582). 
25. See id. at 30–31. 
26. Except for the right to the assistance of counsel, see United States v. Culp, 14 C.M.A. 199, 
217 (1963) (Quinn, C.J., concurring in the result), earlier opinions suggested that the Sixth 
Amendment does not apply to courts-martial.  See, e.g., Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 17 (1942) 
(―[C]ases arising in the land or naval forces . . . are expressly excepted from the Fifth Amendment, 
and are deemed excepted by implication from the Sixth.‖); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 
123 (1866) (stating that ―the framers of the Constitution, doubtless, meant to limit the right of trial by 
jury, in the [S]ixth [A]mendment, to those persons who were subject to indictment or presentment in 
the [F]ifth,‖ which expressly does not apply to the military); see also, e.g., O‘Callahan v. Parker, 395 
U.S. 258, 262–63 (1969) (stating that the Sixth Amendment guarantee to a trial by jury of one‘s peers 
does not apply to criminal cases in military courts). 
27. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
28. See id. at 444.  
29. 378 U.S. 478, 490–91 (1964). 
30. Conversation with Ralph Spritzer, First Assistant to the Solicitor General from 1962 to 
1968, in Tempe, Ariz. (on or around Apr. 20, 2009). 
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to admit the statements, the government focused on trying to persuade the 
Court to base its decision in Miranda on the Fifth Amendment protection 
against self-incrimination,
31
 as opposed to the Sixth Amendment right to the 
assistance of counsel, which had been the basis of the ruling in Escobedo.
32
  
The fear was that, if the ruling was based on the right to counsel, police would 
not merely have to inform suspects of their right to an attorney, but would be 
forbidden from ever conducting questioning without the presence of the 
attorney.
33
 
Another strategy to avoid the development of unfavorable law is the 
confession of error.
34
  A confession of error consists of the government 
arguing that the decision reached by the lower court, though in the 
government‘s favor, was erroneous.35  Although not limited to criminal cases, 
most confessions of error occur on criminal appeals.
36
  The confession of error 
is a useful means for avoiding the establishment of a rule unfavorable to the 
government.  Although courts do not simply accept the confession of error but 
instead conduct an independent evaluation of the merits,
37
 they almost always 
agree with the reason the government gives for its confession, no doubt in part 
because a court is probably more inclined to trust the government when the 
government is arguing against its own interests.
38
  The government therefore 
 
31. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 439. 
32. Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 491.  Compare Brief for the United States at 29, Westover v. United 
States, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (No. 761)  (―We agree that if a suspect‘s post-arrest statement is the 
product of compulsion or overreaching by law-enforcement officers, it has been obtained in violation 
of the Fifth Amendment and is inadmissible as evidence of his guilt.‖), with id. at 39 (―Any attempts 
to import rigid Sixth Amendment concepts into the whole range of investigation for all types of 
crimes, including the myriad daily problems requiring investigation by local police, is beset with 
enormous practical difficulties.‖). 
33. Conversation with Ralph Spritzer, supra note 30. 
34. LINCOLN CAPLAN, THE TENTH JUSTICE: THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE RULE OF LAW 
9 (1987).  
35. Id. 
36. Id. 
37. See Lawrence ex rel. Lawrence v. Chater, 516 U.S. 163, 170–71 (1996) (per curiam) (―All 
Members of the Court are agreed that we ‗should [not] mechanically accept any suggestion from the 
Solicitor General that a decision rendered in favor of the Government by a United States Court of 
Appeals was in error.‘‖) (quoting Mariscal v. United States, 449 U.S. 405, 406 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting)).  But see United States v. Latu, 479 F.3d 1153, 1159 (9th Cir. 2007) (reversing 
conviction based solely on government‘s confession of error).  The judiciary‘s duty to evaluate the 
merits despite a confession of error is reflected in the Supreme Court‘s occasional practice of 
appointing an amicus to defend the lower court judgment when the government confesses error.  See, 
e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 528 U.S. 1045, 1045 (1999). 
38. See David M. Rosenzweig, Note, Confession of Error in the Supreme Court by the Solicitor 
General, 82 GEO. L.J. 2079, 2081 (1994) (―When the Solicitor General claims that reversible error 
has been committed, the Court almost always agrees and reverses.‖) (citation omitted).  Indeed, the 
Supreme Court has criticized circuit courts for not accepting a confession of error.  See Upshaw v. 
United States, 335 U.S. 410, 411–12 (1948). 
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may use the confession of error to steer an appellate court away from adopting 
an overly broad rule and instead to issue a ruling based on narrow grounds.
39
  
Consider Redmond v. United States.
40
  There, the government successfully 
prosecuted a couple for sending nude photographs through the mail.
41
  The 
couple appealed their convictions.
42
  The government confessed error on the 
ground that the prosecution violated a Department of Justice policy that 
prosecutions be limited to those who have repeatedly mailed obscene 
material, and the Court overturned the convictions on that ground.
43
  One 
explanation for the decision to confess error on that ground was that it guided 
the Court away from issuing a ruling providing constitutional protections to 
the mailing of nude photographs. 
Another illustration of confession of error as strategy is Knox v. United 
States.
44
  Knox had been convicted for receiving and possessing videos 
depicting scantily clad underage girls.
45
  He challenged his conviction on the 
ground that the videos did not contain a ―lascivious exhibition of the genitals 
or pubic area‖―an element of the crime for which he was 
convicted
46―because the minors in the video were clothed.47  The Third 
Circuit upheld the conviction, concluding that nudity was not necessary to 
constitute a lascivious exhibition of the pubic area.
48
  After the Supreme Court 
granted Knox‘s petition for certiorari, the Solicitor General confessed error.49  
The principal reason for the Solicitor General‘s confession was that he 
believed the Third Circuit‘s interpretation was ―strained and incorrect.‖50  But 
the Solicitor General later explained that another consideration influencing his 
 
39. See Casey v. United States, 343 U.S. 808, 811–12 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (stating 
that the confession of error may be used ―to save one case at the expense of another‖); Rosenzweig, 
supra note 38, at 2111 (―The need to consider and advance such long-term interests may lead the 
Solicitor General to confess error, even at the cost of sacrificing a victory in a particular case, in 
order to avoid an adverse ruling with potentially far-reaching effects.‖).  Cases decided on confession 
of error constitute precedent as much as any other decision.  See, e.g., Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 
40, 58 (1968) (―[O]ur judgments are precedents, and the proper administration of the criminal law 
cannot be left merely to the stipulation of parties.‖) (citation omitted).  But see Casey, 343 U.S. at 
808 (per curiam) (―To accept in this case his confession of error would not involve the establishment 
of any precedent.‖). 
40. 384 U.S. 264 (1966). 
41. Id. at 264. 
42. See id.   
43. Redmond, 384 U.S. at 264–65.   
44. 510 U.S. 939 (1993). 
45. United States v. Knox, 977 F.2d 815, 817–18 (3d Cir. 1992).  
46. Id. at 820. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. 
49. Drew S. Days, III, When the President Says “No”: A Few Thoughts on Executive Power 
and the Tradition of Solicitor General Independence, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 509, 515 (2001).   
50. Id. 
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decision was that pressing that interpretation before the Court risked the 
―possibility of the Court‘s issuing a broad adverse ruling likely to jeopardize 
later child-pornography prosecutions.‖51 
Argument selection and confession of error are not the only strategies for 
avoiding bad precedent.  The government has a number of other ways to 
discourage the courts from moving the law in unfavorable directions.  For 
example, if the government perceives that an appellate court may issue a 
decision establishing unfavorable law, the government could conceivably 
moot the case by pardoning the defendant.  Although so far as I know, the 
government has not employed that tactic, it did something somewhat similar 
in two of the detainee cases.  To avoid Supreme Court review of the military 
detainment of Jose Padilla and Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri, the government 
moved them to civilian custody.
52
 
B.  Case Selection 
Supplementing the government‘s ability to pick arguments strategically is 
the government‘s ability to choose, to some degree, the context for presenting 
new arguments.  Because it participates in all criminal cases, the government 
may wait for a favorable factual case before presenting an argument.
53
  As the 
maxim that ―‗hard cases make bad law‘‖ suggests,54 the facts of a case may 
 
51. Id.  Knox is also an example of the government deliberately forsaking a good argument in 
an effort to expand the law.  Apparently, the prosecutor in Knox had ―intentionally left out evidence 
of Knox‘s collection of hard-core child pornography‖ in an effort to force the court to hold that 
possession of clothed depictions of minors could be illegal.  Id. 
52. See, e.g., Glenn Greenwald, Preventing a Judicial Ruling on the Power to Imprison Without 
Charges, Salon.com (March 7, 2009), http://www.salon.com/opinion/greenwald/2009/03/07/ 
al_marri/.  The government may have used a comparable tactic to avert Supreme Court review in 
Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660 (2005).  Medellin, a citizen of Mexico, had been sentenced to death 
by a Texas state court.   Id. at 662.  After Medellin unsuccessfully challenged the conviction on direct 
appeal, he filed a petition for habeas corpus first in state court and then federal court, arguing that his 
conviction should be reversed because Texas had failed to inform him of his consular rights under 
the Vienna Convention.   Id.  The state and federal courts both rejected the argument on the ground 
that it was procedurally defaulted because Medellin had not raised the argument on direct appeal.  Id. 
at 662–63.  Meanwhile, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued a decision ordering the United 
States to reconsider Medellin‘s Vienna Convention claim, without regard to procedural default.   Id. at 
663.  Medellin petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari, asking the Court to vacate his conviction 
in light of the ICJ‘s ruling.  See id. at 661–62.  After the petition was granted, the federal government 
issued a memorandum directing the Texas courts to reconsider Medellin‘s petition, which resulted in 
the Supreme Court dismissing the writ.  Id. at 663–64, 667.  One reason for the federal government‘s 
conduct might have been to avoid a potentially sweeping ruling giving broad authority to rulings of 
the ICJ or establishing the enforceability of the Geneva Convention by private individuals.   
53. Criminal defendants cannot take advantage of this strategy.  A defendant is a one-time 
player, and his principal interest is winning his case.  Defendants therefore have an interest in making 
every available argument, regardless of whether his case is the best for making that argument.  
54. Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 883, 884 (2006) (quoting 
N. Secs. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting)). 
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persuade a court to adopt a rule that it otherwise may have rejected.  The case-
by-case nature of the appellate process requires courts to develop rules in the 
context of the facts of a particular case.  Those facts inevitably influence the 
courts in the development of legal rules.
55
  It is hard to doubt, for example, 
that a court would stretch legal doctrine to avoid a ruling that would result in 
the release of Jeffrey Dahmer.  Similarly, a court is bound to be more inclined 
to develop doctrines in a way that is more favorable to sympathetic 
defendants, such as draft dodgers or political demonstrators charged with 
trespass.  Indeed, criminal appeals pose a particularly fertile field for this sort 
of manipulation because criminal cases are more likely than other types of 
cases to present facts that play on visceral instincts.  Serial killers are less 
likely to evoke sympathy than contract breachers. 
The government, therefore, has an interest in raising novel arguments in 
those cases that present the government‘s position in the best possible light.56  
For this reason, the Solicitor General may oppose certiorari, or even refuse to 
seek certiorari itself, in cases that squarely present a circuit conflict, opting 
instead to wait for a case with facts more favorable to the government before 
seeking Supreme Court review (or acquiescing in petitions for certiorari).
57
  
United States v. Resendiz-Ponce
58
 provides an example.  In that case, the 
government petitioned for certiorari on the issue of whether the failure to 
allege an element of an offense in an indictment can be harmless error.
59
  The 
government had opposed certiorari in several previous cases presenting the 
same issue, even after the circuit split warranting certiorari had already been 
well developed.
60
  Those cases presented the issue in circumstances that the 
government may have perceived as unlikely to result in a favorable court 
ruling.  For example, one of those cases, United States v. Allen, was a death 
 
55. Schauer, supra note 54, at 885. 
56. As former Solicitor General Erwin Griswold once said, it is a ―basic rule of the Solicitor 
General‘s office ‗[n]ever [to] risk an important point on a weak case.‘‖   Seth P. Waxman, The 
Physics of Persuasion: Arguing the New Deal, 88 GEO. L.J. 2399, 2400 (2000) (quoting ERWIN N. 
GRISWOLD, OULD FIELDS, NEW CORNE: THE PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF A TWENTIETH CENTURY 
LAWYER 109 (1992)). 
57. See Barbara D. Underwood, Facts on the Ground and Federalism in the Air: The Solicitor 
General’s Effort to Defend Federal Statutes During the Federalism Revival, 21 ST. JOHNS J. LEGAL 
COMMENT. 473, 475–76 (2007). 
58. 549 U.S. 102 (2007). 
59. Id. at 103.  
60. See United States v. Allen, 406 F.3d 940, 945 (8th Cir. 2005); United States v. Robinson, 
367 F.3d 278, 285–86 (5th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1005 (2004); United States v. Higgs, 
353 F.3d 281, 304 (4th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 999 (2004); United States v. Trennell, 290 
F.3d 881, 889–90 (7th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1014 (2002); United States v. Cor-Bon 
Custom Bullet Co., 287 F.3d 576, 580–81 (6th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 880 (2002); United 
States v. Prentiss, 256 F.3d 971, 981–85 (10th Cir. 2001) (en banc); United States v. Corporan-
Cuevas, 244 F.3d 199, 202 (1st Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 880 (2001). 
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penalty case.
61
  The government had omitted from the indictment allegations 
of aggravating factors that, after Ring v. Arizona,
62
 must be included in the 
indictment. 
63
  Defending the conviction would have forced the government to 
make the unattractive argument that the Court permit the imposition of the 
death penalty despite procedural error.
64
 
Resendiz-Ponce did not have this sort of atmospheric problem.  It was not 
a death penalty case.
65
  Resendiz-Ponce had been charged with attempting to 
reenter the United States after deportation.
66
  Moreover, the element that had 
been left out of the indictment did not even appear to be required.
67
  The 
Ninth Circuit held the indictment inadequate because it failed to allege a 
specific overt act that Resendiz-Ponce had committed in seeking to reenter.
68
  
But there was reason to think that the allegation of a specific overt act was not 
required because a number of federal cases had held that an allegation of 
attempt is generally understood to implicitly include an allegation of an overt 
act.
69
  It stands to reason that the government decided to seek review in 
Resendiz-Ponce in part because it perceived that the Court would be more 
inclined to rule that the failure to include an element in the indictment was 
harmless, given that alleging that element probably was not even required. 
The strategy of not pressing arguments in unsympathetic cases is not 
limited to the cases before the Supreme Court.  The Solicitor General may 
withhold authorization to appeal in cases with facts that cast the government‘s 
argument in a bad light.  The government‘s practice in appeals of sentencing 
decisions provides an example.  In United States v. Booker, the Supreme 
Court held that federal sentences are reviewed for reasonableness on appeal.
70
  
Since Booker, the government has been quite selective in deciding which 
sentences to appeal as unreasonable.  It has explained that it does not appeal 
 
61. 406 F.3d at 943. 
62. 536 U.S. 584 (2002). 
63. Id. 
64. See Allen, 406 F.3d at 943. 
65. United States v. Resendiz-Ponce, 425 F.3d 729, 730 (9th Cir. 2005). 
66. Id. 
67. Id. at 731–32.  
68. Id. at 731. 
69. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 416 F.3d 123, 128 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v. 
Gallagher, 83 F. App‘x 742, 744 (6th Cir. 2003); United States v. Cardenas-Alvarez, 987 F.2d 1129, 
1131–32 (5th Cir. 1993); see also United States v. Gregory, No. 03-CR-50027-1, 2003 WL 
21698447, at *1 (N.D. Ill. July 21, 2003) (stating that an allegation of attempt implicitly includes an 
allegation of an overt act); United States v. Bolden, No. 95-40062-01, 1995 WL 783638, at *2 
(D. Kan. Dec. 20, 1995).  Although some courts required proof of a separate specific overt act, those 
courts did not specify whether the indictment must separately allege that act.  See United States v. 
Marte, 356 F.3d 1336, 1344–45 (11th Cir. 2004); United States v. De León, 270 F.3d 90, 92 (1st Cir. 
2001). 
70. 543 U.S. 220, 261 (2005). 
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all sentences in which the district court has awarded a downward variance 
from the Sentencing Guidelines.
71
  Instead, it appeals only a ―small 
percentage‖ of such cases, challenging only those sentences where the 
unreasonableness of the sentence is clear.
72
  Sentences on the margin of 
reasonableness pose the greatest risk of being found reasonable by the 
appellate courts and, accordingly, of resulting in the appellate court creating 
law adverse to the government interest.  By appealing only those downward 
variances that the government believes are likely to be found unreasonable, 
the government minimizes those risks. 
Of course, there are limits to the strategy of case selection.  Although the 
government has complete control when it is the potential appellant in a case, it 
has substantially less control when it is the appellee because the decision 
whether to appeal rests with the defendant.  Still, the government has some 
control insofar as it may choose which arguments to make as an appellee.
73
 
Case selection based on favorable facts is not the only strategy relating to 
argument presentation.  Another such strategy is to move the law 
incrementally over a series of cases, thereby convincing an appellate court in 
the long run to adopt a rule that the court might have initially found too 
extreme to accept.  The most famous use of this strategy is the NAACP‘s line 
of suits seeking to desegregate schools.
74
  During the 1930s and 1940s, the 
NAACP filed test cases arguing that specific black institutions were unequal 
to analogous white institutions; the NAACP argued in later suits that those 
earlier cases established the basic principle that separate means unequal.
75
  
 
71. Brief for the United States at 41, Claiborne v. United States, 551 U.S. 87 (2007) (No. 06-
5618). 
72. Id.   
And the government appeals a small percentage of sentences on the ground of 
unreasonableness, while criminal defendants appeal a high percentage (likely 
including nearly all upward variances).  Both the FPCD [Federal Public and 
Community Defenders] and the NYCDL [New York Council of Defense 
Lawyers] report more than 17 times as many defendant appeals as government 
appeals, despite the fact that, since Booker, district courts have imposed below-
Guidelines sentences more than seven times as often as above-Guidelines 
sentences.   
Id. (citation omitted).  According to Professors Bibas and Klein, the unofficial rule is that the 
government will not appeal sentences within 50% of a guideline range.  Stephanos Bibas & Susan 
Klein, The Sixth Amendment and Criminal Sentencing, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 775, 794 n.91 (2008). 
73. The government continues to have more control as a respondent before the Supreme Court 
than before other appellate courts.  The government can offer various grounds for opposing 
certiorari, and when certiorari is granted, the government has various tools to force the Court to 
dismiss the writ as improvidently granted, including granting a pardon to the defendant.   
74. See Susan D. Carle, Race, Class, and Legal Ethics in the Early NAACP (1910–1920), 20 
LAW & HIST. REV. 97, 115–16 (2002). 
75. See Genna Rae McNeil, Charles Hamilton Houston, 3 BLACK L.J. 123, 125–26 (1973).  For 
more discussion of individual test cases, see GENNA RAE MCNEIL, GROUNDWORK: CHARLES 
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The government has frequently employed a similar strategy in both criminal 
and noncriminal cases.
76
  The government‘s effort to limit the exclusionary 
rule for Fourth Amendment violations provides an example.  In 1984, the 
government convinced the Court in Leon to adopt a good-faith exception to 
the warrant requirement for searches.
77
  Chances are that the Court would 
have rejected the good-faith exception in the early 1970s.  At that time, Court 
opinions suggested that any violations of the Fourth Amendment necessarily 
resulted in exclusion.
78
  But during the 1970s and 1980s, the Court decided a 
series of cases creating exceptions to the exclusionary rule.
79
  These inroads 
were based on the Court‘s conclusion that the purpose of the exclusionary rule 
is not to remedy the violation of individual rights, but to deter law 
enforcement from violating the Fourth Amendment, and that the exceptions 
were proper because requiring exclusion in those circumstances would not 
achieve additional deterrence.
80
  In light of these decisions,
81
 the Court was 
 
HAMILTON HOUSTON AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS 133–54 (1983). 
76. The government employed a similar incremental strategy in litigation surrounding the Gold 
Clause, the Commerce Clause, and legislation enacted during the New Deal.  See Waxman, supra 
note 6, at 1118; see also Transcript, Rex E. Lee Conference on the Office of the Solicitor General of 
the United States, 2003 BYU L. REV. 1, 151 (2003). 
Finally, the ultimate constraint in this area is that the whole premise of 
picking cases and moving the best one forward in an effort to move the law 
incrementally in a direction that the solicitor general, on behalf of the political 
branches, believes is correct is just that—it is a strategy incrementally to move 
the law. 
Id. 
77. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913 (1984). 
78. Id. at 905 (―Language in opinions of this Court and of individual Justices has sometimes 
implied that the exclusionary rule is a necessary corollary of the Fourth Amendment . . . .‖) (citation 
omitted). 
79. See, e.g., United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 627–28 (1980) (allowing prosecutor to use 
illegally obtained evidence to impeach statements made by a defendant ―in response to proper cross-
examination reasonably suggested by the defendant‘s direct examination‖); United States v. 
Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 279 (1978) (allowing testimony of a witness whose identity was discovered 
through an illegal search); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 (1976) (holding that 
exclusionary rule does not apply in federal civil tax proceedings to evidence obtained by a state 
criminal law enforcement officer in good-faith reliance on a warrant that later proved to be 
defective); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603–05 (1975) (refusing to adopt a per se rule rendering 
inadmissible any evidence obtained because of an illegal arrest); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 
338, 349 (1974) (refusing to extend exclusionary rule to grand jury proceedings); see also Stone v. 
Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976) (refusing to extend exclusionary rule to habeas proceedings).  
80. See, e.g., Janis, 428 U.S. at 446 (―[T]he ‗prime purpose‘ of the rule, if not the sole one, ‗is 
to deter future unlawful police conduct.‘‖) (quoting Calandra, 414 U.S. at 347); id. at 348 
(describing the exclusionary rule as ―a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth 
Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of 
the party aggrieved‖); see also Stone, 428 U.S. at 486  (―The primary justification for the 
exclusionary rule then is the deterrence of police conduct that violates Fourth Amendment rights.‖). 
81. Indeed, the 1976 decision United States v. Janis recognized a limited good-faith exception, 
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more likely to be amenable to the government‘s argument in Leon for the 
good-faith exception, which itself was premised on the notion that requiring 
exclusion when law enforcement has made a good-faith mistake would not 
deter violations of the Fourth Amendment.
82
  Moreover, statements by 
Solicitor General Waxman suggest that the progression of cases leading up to 
Leon was part of a deliberate strategy of the government to shift the law of the 
Fourth Amendment in a more government-friendly direction.
83
 
III.  THE DESIRABILITY OF THE GOVERNMENT‘S INFLUENCE 
If the government can affect the development of criminal law through 
strategies on appeals, one natural question is whether this influence is 
problematic.  At first glance, the answer might seem to be ―no‖ because the 
government‘s ability to influence the law through procedural strategies is 
probably rather limited.  Although it is unclear just how much the government 
can influence the development of law through appellate strategy, it seems 
likely that appellate strategies have less impact on the development of the law 
than many other factors.  After all, the government‘s strategies do not give the 
government direct control over the development of criminal law; the appellate 
courts have that control, and government manipulation is probably low on the 
list of influences on appellate court decisions.  The effect of the government‘s 
strategies may be nothing more than to alter the playing field in a way that 
either temporarily forestalls a court from adopting an argument or encourages 
a court to accept an argument that it is already inclined to accept. 
Still, there are reasons to question the desirability of the government‘s 
influence through appellate strategies.  To start, the creation and development 
of law are functions performed by the legislature and courts, and it is one of 
the basic principles of our government that the Executive should not perform 
legislative or judicial functions.
84
  Maintaining that separation is particularly 
important in the criminal law context because the purpose of dividing powers 
was to protect individual liberties from government intrusion, and criminal 
penalties pose one of the greatest threats to those liberties.
85
  Allowing the 
 
holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply in federal civil tax proceedings to evidence obtained 
by a state criminal law enforcement officer in good-faith reliance on a warrant that later proved to be 
defective.  Janis, 428 U.S. at 454. 
82. See generally Brief for the United States at 22, United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) 
(No. 82-1771). 
83. Rex E. Lee Conference, supra note 76, at 151 (quoting Seth P. Waxman, Solicitor General 
from 1997 to 2001, who remarked that Deputy Solicitor General Andy Frey ―shepherded the Fourth 
Amendment cases‖ during the 1970s and 1980s). 
84. See Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989, 
997 (2006). 
85. Id. at 1012–34. 
2009] IMPACT OF GOVERNMENT APPELLATE STRATEGIES 491 
branch that is charged with prosecuting criminal defendants to shape the 
criminal law poses a risk that the law will develop in ways that are less 
protective of defendants‘ rights and more likely to result in the imposition of 
criminal penalties.
86
 
In addition, there is something unsettling about the fact that appellate 
strategies tend to push the law in only the government‘s favor.  As noted 
above, defendants do not have the same opportunities or incentives to use 
appellate strategies to develop the law in defendant-friendly ways.  Appellate 
strategy, thus, is an unequal tool that may tend to push the criminal law in the 
government‘s favor over the long run. 
Most important, appellate strategies are not the only way in which the 
government may influence the development of criminal law.  The government 
has a number of other tools at its disposal for fashioning the criminal law.  For 
instance, the government may directly seek to change criminal law through 
legislation.  Although the government is not the sole interest group involved 
in criminal legislation, it is the most powerful, and the interests of other 
groups tend to coincide more with those of the government than those of 
defendants.
87
  The Department of Justice also has a seat on the federal rules 
committee,
88
 which provides the Department with a measure of influence over 
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
More generally, the government has a number of other weapons in its 
arsenal that skew the criminal process in its favor.  The vast number of 
different criminal laws provides prosecutors with broad discretion in which 
charges to bring.  Prosecutors also have the power to enter into plea deals and 
recommend sentences.  Given today‘s norm of plea bargaining, these powers 
provide prosecutors substantial control over the criminal process and the 
sentences defendants receive.
89
  At the same time, defendants are in a weaker 
position than the government in the bargaining process.  Most federal criminal 
 
86. This is not to say that maximizing convictions and punishment are the Executive‘s primary 
priority.  The government‘s ultimate goal is to accomplish justice.  But to the extent that combating 
crime is one of the ways by which the government may attain that goal, it may seek to push the law 
in a more restrictive way. 
87. See Carissa Byrne Hessick, Why Are Only Bad Acts Good Sentencing Factors?, 88 B.U. L. 
REV. 1109, 1130 (2008); William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L.  
REV. 505, 529 (2001) (―[F]or most of criminal law, the effect of private interest groups is small: the 
most important interest groups are usually other government actors, chiefly police and prosecutors.‖)  
(footnote omitted). 
88. See James C. Duff, The Rulemaking Process: A Summary for the Bench and Bar (Oct. 
2007), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/proceduresum.htm. 
89. Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from 
Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 871 (2009) (―Federal prosecutors control the terms of 
confinement in this vast penal system because they have the authority to make charging decisions, 
enter cooperation agreements, accept pleas, and recommend sentences.‖). 
492 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [93:477 
laws carry such substantial penalties that the defendant has little leverage 
against the government, and the government may threaten to bring 
prosecutions against friends or relatives of defendants if they refuse to accept 
the government‘s deal.90  The government also has significant advantages at 
criminal trials because of limits on discovery against the government.
91
 
The combination of the government‘s partial control over the development 
of the criminal law and its ability to skirt the judiciary through the plea 
bargaining process may result in the government being too powerful in the 
criminal context.  Reducing the government‘s ability to influence the law 
through appellate strategies would help correct that balance. 
Although appellate strategies are probably among the weaker weapons in 
the government‘s arsenal, limiting the impact of appellate strategies is almost 
certainly easier to do than restricting the government‘s ability to use tools 
such as plea bargaining or lobbying.  Placing any limits on the government‘s 
prosecutorial powers is bound to be unpopular—as are all measures that 
appear ―soft on crime‖—and the decision to limit the government‘s power to 
plea bargain, to recommend sentences, or to lobby rests with the political 
branches, which obviously seek to avoid unpopular measures.
92
  By contrast, 
appellate courts, which are not as beholden to popularity, have the power to 
limit the impact of appellate strategy, because, after all, those strategies are 
simply tools for manipulating the courts. 
Courts have no way to avert the effect of some government strategies.  If 
the government moots a case, for example, a court has no alternative but to 
dismiss.  But courts can counteract a number of other government strategies 
by simply refusing to be manipulated.  Thus, for example, if the government 
opts against making an obvious favorable argument in favor of making a 
novel, less certain argument in an apparent effort to extend the law in the 
government‘s favor, a court may nevertheless exercise its discretion to decide 
the case on the more established ground.
93
  To avoid the influence of the 
 
90. See United States v. Spilmon, 454 F.3d 657, 658 (7th Cir. 2006) (rejecting the claim that a 
plea is involuntary if it was accepted to prevent charges against a relative).  
91. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(2), 26.2; Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 825 (1996) 
(―A criminal defendant is entitled to rather limited discovery, with no general right to obtain the 
statements of the Government‘s witnesses before they have testified.‖). 
92. Most proposed reforms have focused on the government‘s role in plea bargaining and 
sentencing recommendations because the government‘s powers over plea bargaining and sentencing 
are much more powerful tools than the influence the government may obtain through appellate 
strategy.  See Barkow, supra note 84, at 1046–47. 
93. The Supreme Court followed that course in United States v. Resendiz-Ponce, 549 U.S. 102 
(2007).  There, the government declined to seek review of the court of appeals‘ holding that the 
commission of an overt act was an element of the offense of attempted unlawful reentry, and instead 
sought review solely on the issue whether, assuming that an overt act was required, its omission from 
an indictment is harmless.  Id. at 103–04.  But on its own initiative, the Court reversed based on its 
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government‘s strategy of raising a novel argument on appeal because the case 
presents particularly sympathetic facts, appellate judges should consider 
fashioning the ruling to be limited to the facts of the case, or writing dicta or 
issuing separate opinions providing examples of when the rule would not 
apply.
94
  Courts could similarly write dicta in opinions that create exceptions 
to rules to prevent those exceptions from providing the foundation for more 
drastic changes.  Courts already employ all of these mechanisms for reasons 
other than minimizing the impact of strategy, and employing them to 
minimize the influence of appellate strategies accordingly would not cause 
any disruption to the judicial process. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The criminal law is constantly changing.  Appellate courts are one of the 
principal sources of that evolution, and insofar as appellate strategies may 
influence that evolution, the government has reason to employ them. 
I do not want to overstate the importance of appellate strategies.  Strategy 
influences courts less than other considerations, such as the strength of the 
substantive arguments, and for that reason, governments routinely focus more 
on substantive arguments than on appellate strategy.  Indeed, to the extent 
strategies may appear to have been effective, that success may in fact be 
attributable, at least in part, to any number of factors other than to the efficacy 
of the strategy.  It is also important to recognize that no one government has 
complete strategic control.  The federal government and each of the state 
governments may develop appellate strategies, and those strategies often are 
not coordinated.  State governments, for example, often seek certiorari in 
cases in which the federal government opposes certiorari for strategic reasons.  
Moreover, although their ability to strategize is less substantial than the 
government‘s, pro-defense interest groups like the ACLU can exert some 
influence on courts through their strategies.  Finally, judges themselves 
occasionally engage in strategic behavior, and their strategies may conflict 
with the strategy of the government.
95
 
Still, there is no doubt that the government‘s appellate strategies may have 
some effect on the development of the criminal law.  The effect of these 
strategies may be undesirable.  Over the long run, this effect may tilt the 
 
conclusion that an overt act was not required, and it accordingly did not reach the harmless-error 
issue.  Id. at 104. 
94. Dictum ordinarily is disfavored because it involves a court in exceeding its traditional 
function by making law beyond that necessary to decide the case.  See Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and 
Article III, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997, 2001 (1994).  But that concern may be outweighed when the 
dictum serves the role of limiting the arguably unwarranted influence of the Executive.  
95. See, e.g.,Virginia A. Hettinger, Stefanie A. Lindquist & Wendy L. Martinek, JUDGING ON A 
COLLEGIAL COURT: INFLUENCES ON FEDERAL APPELLATE DECISION MAKING 75–76 (2006). 
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playing field against criminal defendants by producing law that is the product 
of tactics instead of principles.  But with diligence and attention, the courts 
can reduce the impact of those strategies and concentrate on fashioning law 
that is the product of principle free from strategic influences. 
 
